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Recent developments in the analysis of derived relational responding, under the rubric of relational
frame theory, have brought several complex language and cognitive phenomena within the empirical
reach of the experimental analysis of behavior. The current paper provides an outline of relational
frame theory as a new approach to the analysis of language, cognition, and complex behavior more
generally. Relational frame theory, it is argued, also provides a suitable paradigm for the analysis
of a wide variety of social behavior that is mediated by language. Recent empirical evidence and
theoretical interpretations are provided in support of the relational frame approach to social behavior.
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Relational frame theory (RFT;
Hayes, 1991; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes,
& Roche, 2001) provides a naturalistic
and functional-analytic account of lan-
guage and cognitive phenomena. This
theory provides a definition of lan-
guage and cognitive events in terms of
derived relational responding. More-
over, RFT attempts to specify the types
of social interactions that lead to the
emergence of language and cognitive
skills in the first instance (see Barnes,
1994; Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001;
Hayes, Gifford, & Ruckstuhl, 1996).
For the reader to appreciate the poten-
tial of RFT for the analysis of complex
behavior in general, and social behav-
ior in particular, we must first outline
the basic features of this theory. Hav-
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ing considered RFT as an approach to
complex behavior, we will then dem-
onstrate how RFT can be applied the-
oretically and empirically in the anal-
ysis of a variety of social behaviors.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY
Most published research on derived
relational responding has focused on the
familiar stimulus equivalence effect,
which can be described essentially as
follows. If a verbally able human subject
is trained, in a matching-to-sample con-
text, to match A to B and B to C, he or
she will also likely match C to A and A
to C without reinforcement (see Fields,
Adams, Verhave, & Newman, 1990;
Sidman, 1992). Relational frame theory
extends the analysis of this effect by
treating stimulus equivalence as just one
instance of a variety of derived stimulus
relations (Barnes, 1994; Hayes, 1991,
1994; Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Steele &
Hayes, 1991). More specifically, several
studies to date have provided empirical
evidence that it is possible for human
subjects to respond in accordance with
relations other than equivalence, such as
difference, opposition, more than, and
less than (Dymond & Barnes, 1995,
1996; O'Hora, Roche, Barnes-Holmes,
& Smeets, in press; Roche & Barnes,
1996, 1997; Roche, Barnes-Holmes,
75
76 BRYAN ROCHE et al.
Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, & McGeady,
2000; Steele & Hayes, 1991). Several
further studies have attempted to identify
relational histories necessary to establish
contextual stimulus functions for derived
relational responding in the first in-
stance (e.g., Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001; Lip-
kens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; see also
Y. Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
Most RFT studies to date have at-
tempted to demonstrate that derived re-
lations can transform the functions of
events. For instance, if a child learns
at school that men and women are of
the opposite sex (i.e., a relation of op-
position between men and women) and
further learns that men are strong (i.e.,
a relation of coordination between the
terms men and strong), they may de-
rive that women are weak. If the child
then further learns that strength comes
with age, they may derive that younger
women are weaker than older women,
and that younger women are even
weaker still than older men. In effect,
a relational network of trained and de-
rived stimulus relations pertaining to
gender has been established (see Roche
& Barnes, 1997, for a relevant study).
Relational frame theory is a conser-
vative account of derived relational ac-
tivity. This theory adopts the basic po-
sition that derived relational respond-
ing is generalized operant behavior.
From this perspective, the act of relat-
ing is a contextually controlled over-
arching response class that can occur
with an infinite variety of stimulus to-
pographies. Relational frame theory
suggests that contextual control for re-
lational responding is established for
humans during early language interac-
tions. For example, children are often
presented with objects and asked to re-
peat their names. This can be described
as see Object A, hear Name B, and say
Name B. Children are also taught to
identify objects when they hear the ap-
propriate name. This can be described
as hear Name B, then orient towards
Object A. Initially, each object-word
and word-object relation is explicitly
trained. However, when a child has
been exposed to enough of this rela-
tional training, generalized relational
responding may emerge. Suppose, for
example, that a child with this history
of naming is taught "This is your toy."
Contextual cues (such as the word is
and the context of the social interaction
more generally) predict that if this ob-
ject is a "toy" (Object A, Name B), a
"toy" is this object (Name B, Object
A). Consequently, the child may now
identify the object when asked "Where
is your toy?" in the absence of prior
differential reinforcement for doing so.
Thus, deriving relations is not genuine-
ly novel but is a type of generalized
operant behavior (see D. Barnes-
Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000, for
an extended discussion).
Patterns of relational responding are
brought under the control of contextual
cues (e.g., the word is) through a sim-
ple process of differential reinforce-
ment. That is, to begin, both directions
of a relation are explicitly trained (e.g.,
"A is B" and "B is X' are both rein-
forced). It is only when a sufficient
range of such exemplars has been
trained that the relation can generalize
to a novel set of stimuli. For instance,
following exemplar training for bidi-
rectional relations and training in the
relation "X is Y," a child may derive
"Y is X" without reinforcement. Other
than the topography of the stimuli in-
volved, there is nothing new in this lat-
ter derived performance that has not
been reinforced during training. How-
ever, the trained response has general-
ized and is now applicable to any set
of relata. When this occurs, the pattern
of generalized derived responding is
referred to as a relational frame. Thus,
RFT simply suggests that the well-es-
tablished concept of the operant can be
extended (to relational responding) to
explain one of the key generative fea-
tures of human language.
Other types of stimulus relations,
such as comparison, may also be ex-
plained in terms of generalized operant
behavior. Consider, for example, a
young child who is taught to respond
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to a range of questions such as "Which
cup has more milk?" or "Which box
has more toys?" Given sufficient ex-
posure to such questions and appropri-
ate reinforcement for answering them
correctly, the appropriate response to
the cups may come under the control
of cues in addition to the actual relative
quantities of milk in the cups (e.g., the
word more). For example, a dime is
worth more than a nickel, even though
a dime is actually smaller in size than
a nickel. As responses are brought un-
der the contextual control of the appro-
priate cues (e.g., the word more), they
become arbitrarily applicable. In other
words, the child may eventually an-
swer questions regarding relative quan-
tity correctly, even with novel varieties
of stimuli and in contexts in which the
appropriate response cannot be based
on the formal properties of the stimuli
involved (e.g., the relative value of
coins). When this occurs, a relational
frame of comparison has been estab-
lished.
Relational frame theory can be used
in the analysis of entire networks of re-
lations. Relational networks help us to
describe the patterns according to
which functions transform in the pres-
ence of particular contextual cues.
Imagine, for instance, that we train the
following network of relations: Stimu-
lus A bigger than Stimulus B, B bigger
than C, C same as D (i.e., A > B > C
= D). Now suppose that we establish
an aversive stimulus function for D by
pairing it with an electric shock. Based
on the established relational network,
we should expect the conditioned aver-
sive stimulus function to emerge for C
(i.e., because it is the same as D), but
to be amplified for B (because it is big-
ger than C), and to be amplified further
for A (because it is bigger than B and
bigger than C). Relational frame theory
refers to this effect as a transformation
offunctions to describe changes in the
functions of the A and B stimuli in ac-
cordance with the relational network in
which they participate. Indeed, several
studies have demonstrated this type of
complex derived transformation of
function effect with operant and re-
spondent functions (see Dymond &
Barnes, 1995, 1996; Roche & Barnes,
1997; Roche et al., 2000).
Before presenting our RFT analysis
of social behavior, we will consider
one final feature of RFT that is relevant
in the current context. Specifically,
RFT places a special emphasis on the
role of verbal consistency in maintain-
ing verbal behavior in the absence of
explicit reinforcement. As we shall see
in later sections, the reinforcing effects
of verbal consistency play an important
role in several social psychological
phenomena. Interestingly, it was re-
search on stimulus equivalence that
first alerted researchers to the role of
response consistency in maintaining
derived relational responding (e.g.,
Bush, Sidman, & de Rose, 1989;
Spradlin, Cotter, & Baxley, 1973). Sid-
man (1994) noted during this early re-
search on stimulus equivalence that
class-consistent test performances of-
ten develop gradually without any ap-
parent change in contingencies. In at-
tempting to explain this effect, Sidman
pointed to the fact that every stimulus
is a member of multiple classes, in ad-
dition to those designated by the ex-
perimenter. For instance, although
Stimulus Al may participate in a class
with Stimulus B1 based on reinforced
conditional discriminations, from the
subject's perspective B1 may also par-
ticipate in a class with A2 based on
formal similarities (e.g., both B1 and
A2 may contain four sharp edges).
Thus, given B 1 as a sample in a test
for symmetry with Al and A2 as com-
parisons, the subject may choose Al
on the basis of experimental contingen-
cies or A2 on the basis of preexperi-
mental contingencies. In effect, re-
sponding to A2 is "incorrect" from the
point of view of the experimenter but
is "correct" from the point of view of
the subject. Given that equivalence
tests are conducted in extinction, there
are no differential consequences for
one response or the other. However, be-
cause sample and comparison stimuli
vary across trials, the only response
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pattern consistently available across all
trials is that established by the experi-
mental contingencies (e.g., matching
on the basis of four sharp edges is only
rarely an option). According to Sid-
man, it is only when a sufficient num-
ber of trials have been presented that
the one consistent basis for responding
becomes evident and begins to control
responses. Across these trials, inconsis-
tent response patterns are washed out
and the relation that is possible on ev-
ery trial eventually becomes the con-
sistent basis for choice (see Harrison &
Green, 1990, for empirical evidence of
this effect).
Relational frame theory goes one
step further by suggesting that, given a
protracted history of reinforced lan-
guage interactions within the social
community, a multitude of contexts
should support ongoing derived rela-
tional responding in the absence of re-
inforcement. In essence, RFT predicts
that correspondences in a relational
network (i.e., verbal coherence) will
function as a relatively powerful rein-
forcer for relational activity itself, and
that this will be an important feature of
the verbal behavior of most individu-
als. Indeed, several studies have shown
that say-do correspondences can be re-
inforced (Baer, Detrich, & Weninger,
1988; Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews,
1987; de Freitas Ribeiro, 1989; Lloyd,
1980; Paniagua, 1985; Riegler & Baer,
1989). Moreover, children are taught to
be consistent in what they say and do
from the time they can control their so-
cial environments through speaking.
There are even strong sanctions against
adults for being inconsistent in their
behavior (see Guerin, 1994, p. 159).
Other researchers have examined the
social processes involved in the main-
tenance of verbal consistency across
verbal episodes (see Schauss, Chase, &
Hawkins, 1997). It should not be sur-
prising, therefore, if verbal consisten-
cy, and behavior-behavior consistency
more generally, were to become a con-
ditioned reinforcer for verbal behavior
itself.
Although behavioral consistency may
be trained in even the simplest of or-
ganisms, a special variety of consisten-
cy is available to the verbal organism.
More specifically, given a history of
derived relational responding, a verbal
organism may respond to consistencies
across behavior and verbal episodes
that are topographically dissimilar. For
instance, a speaker may respond to two
different statements made in different
languages as having the same meaning.
Furthermore, they may respond to the
verbal coherence that is obtained
across the base and target domains
specified in analogies (e.g., "hand is to
glove as foot is to shoe") and meta-
phors (e.g., "cats are dictators") in a
way that would seem impossible for a
nonverbal organism (see Stewart,
Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets,
2001). From the RFT perspective, once
an extensive network of relational
frames is established and a history of
reinforcement is provided for produc-
ing coherent relational networks (i.e.,
not contradicting oneself), coherence
will serve as a continuously available
reinforcer for derived relational re-
sponding. That is, language will be-
come a self-sustaining process because
the very product of relational respond-
ing (i.e., coherent relational networks)
is itself a conditioned reinforcer for
further relational activity. As we shall
see subsequently, verbal coherence
plays an important role in several as-
pects of social behavior.
Relational frame theory is relatively
new to the field of behavior analysis.
In a short period, however, RFT has
contributed to the analysis of language,
cognition, and complex behavior gen-
erally (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001). However, many research
questions still remain regarding the
precise nature of the verbal and non-
verbal interactions that generate and
maintain derived relational responding.
For instance, researchers have attempt-
ed to explain why some derived rela-
tions can be altered more readily than
others when baseline conditional dis-
criminations are altered during equiv-
alence training (i.e., symmetrical and
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transitive relations; see Pilgrim & Gal-
izio, 1995). Others have questioned the
high failure rate in arbitrary matching-
to-sample tasks in verbally able chil-
dren (Pilgrim, Jackson, & Galizio,
2000) and the failure to establish
equivalence classes with verbally so-
phisticated adult humans, particularly
when large numbers of stimuli are in-
volved (see Fields et al., 1990). Indeed
the very stability of derived equiva-
lence relations has been questioned
(Pilgrim et al., 2000; Spradlin, Saun-
ders, & Saunders, 1992). Despite these
research questions, RFT has neverthe-
less brought researchers into empirical
contact with a host of hitherto unex-
amined complex behavioral phenome-
na and generated a healthy body of re-
search questions. Some studies, for in-
stance, have used the RFT approach to
study syntax and grammar as products
of highly complex contextual control
for relational responding (Cullinan,
Barnes, Hampson, & Lyddy, 1994).
Other studies have applied RFT in the
experimental analysis of analogy, met-
aphor (Stewart, Barnes-Holmes,
Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001), and rule fol-
lowing (Hayes & Hayes, 1989; O'Hora
& Barnes-Holmes, 2001). Some further
studies have applied the RFT analysis
to behavior that extends beyond the os-
tensibly verbal, such as sexual catego-
rization (Roche & Barnes, 1996), sex-
ual arousal (Roche & Barnes, 1997,
1998; Roche et al., 2000), and attitude
formation and change (Grey & Barnes,
1996; Roche, Barnes, & Smeets,
1997). The current paper is primarily
concerned with this latter type of re-
search.
In what follows, we will show how
the relational frame approach to verbal
events can provide a philosophically
coherent and technologically advanced
approach to discourse, social knowl-
edge, and behavior that will move us
towards greater prediction and influ-
ence in these domains.
AN RFT APPROACH
TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Language is essentially a social ac-
tivity (Skinner, 1957). Only a social
community can provide the learning
history necessary to use words appro-
priately and to produce derived rela-
tional responding. Insofar as RFT is an
adequate approach to language devel-
opment and maintenance, then, it must
necessarily comment on the relation
between language and social behavior.
Of course, other behavioral approaches
to social behavior are possible within
the framework of Skinner's Verbal Be-
havior (1957; see Guerin, 1994) or the
sizable body of research on rule-gov-
erned behavior (Kunkel, 1997; see also
Schauss et al., 1997). There are several
technical problems, however, with
Skinner's approach to verbal behavior
and rule governance (e.g., O'Hora &
Barnes-Holmes, 2001). An adequate
consideration of these problems would
itself merit extensive discussion; one
has recently been provided within the
pages of this journal (see D. Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan,
2000, for a full discussion of the rela-
tion between RF' and Skinner's ac-
count of verbal behavior; see also
Hayes, Blackledge, & Barnes-Holmes,
2001; Hayes & Hayes, 1989). Suffice
to say at this point that RFT does not
reject the Skinnerian approach but
rather builds upon it with multiple de-
rived stimulus relations (see Chase &
Danforth, 1991, and Guerin, 1994, for
analyses of language that supplement
Skinner's Verbal Behavior with the
concept of stimulus equivalence).
Thus, although the current RF' ap-
proach to social behavior is not explic-
itly Skinnerian, we remain mindful that
Skinner's account of verbal behavior
has provided the conceptual bedrock
for RF' itself.
Analyses of social behavior have
also been provided from cultural an-
thropological (e.g., Harris, 1977) and
Kantorian perspectives (Kantor, 1982;
see also Houmanfar, Hayes, & Freder-
icks, 2001). Such analyses, however,
are presented in terms of broad social,
moral, and survival contingencies and
are not sufficiently detailed and psy-
chological to promise the immediate
prediction and influence of the social
80 BRYAN ROCHE et al.
behavior of individuals in a laboratory
context or otherwise.
In what follows we will outline a se-
ries of social psychological phenomena
that have become amenable to behav-
ioral research in terms of relational
frame theory. In several cases, we will
provide empirical data to support the
RFI approach to social behavior. Our
aim here, however, is not to present an
already completed analysis of social
psychological phenomena, but to out-
line an ongoing agenda of research and
to share with the reader our vision of
a technologically sophisticated and
conceptually coherent approach to so-
cial psychology.
Social Categorization and Group
Cohesion
Social categorization is traditionally
thought to underlie social identity (e.g.,
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For instance,
by categorizing oneself and others as
in-group or out-group members, indi-
viduals create a social identity for
themselves and may benefit from an
enhanced boost in self-esteem (Tajfel,
1982). Group membership is beneficial
for the individual because it prescribes
modes of action and reduces ambiguity
in social situations. An important ques-
tion for the behavior analyst, however,
is how precisely does group member-
ship influence the verbal behavior of
members in social settings? In answer-
ing this type of question, social psy-
chologists have focused their attention
on mediating cognitive processes (e.g.,
Hogg & Turner, 1987). From a behav-
ioral perspective, however, what is re-
quired is direct influence over the cat-
egorization process itself. One group of
behavioral researchers has attempted to
do just this in the context of political
struggles in Northern Ireland (Watt,
Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991).
In the Watt et al. (1991) study, a
simple stimulus-equivalence-type par-
adigm was used to take advantage of
the fact that people in Northern Ireland
often respond to each others' names as
discriminative for their religious back-
grounds. During the study, Northern
Irish and English subjects were trained
to relate three Catholic names to three
nonsense syllables, and subsequently
to relate the three nonsense syllables to
three traditionally Protestant symbols
(i.e., the words Union Jack, Orange
Order, and Lambeg Drum). During the
test for derived relations, subjects were
presented with Protestant symbols as
samples; the comparisons were two of
the Catholic names used during train-
ing and a novel Protestant name. All of
the English subjects chose the Catholic
name (related through equivalence to
the Protestant symbols), but 12 of the
19 Northern Irish subjects chose the
Protestant name in the presence of the
Protestant symbols, thereby failing to
form laboratory-induced equivalence
relations.
It might be suggested that the social
contingencies of reinforcement that op-
erate in the Northern Ireland commu-
nity were responsible for the nonequiv-
alence responding of the 12 Northern
Irish subjects. In other words, only the
Northern Irish subjects had been so-
cially trained to respond to Protestant
symbols and Catholic names as be-
longing to socially exclusive catego-
ries. Watt et al. (1991) suggested that
on the basis of prior social training,
Northern Irish subjects who failed the
equivalence test may have been re-
sponding in accordance with the rela-
tional frame of sameness (i.e., Protes-
tant symbols with Protestant names),
and those Northern Irish subjects who
passed may have been responding in
accordance with the relational frame of
opposition (i.e., Protestant symbols
with Catholic names).
Although RFT provides nomencla-
ture for describing the relevant stimu-
lus relations involved in social cate-
gorization (e.g., same, opposite), it re-
mains an empirical matter to identify
precisely the individual social learning
histories required to produce the per-
formances observed in the Watt et al.
(1991) study. For instance, in a labo-
ratory setting RFT can clearly predict
and allow control of the emergence of
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specific functions for given stimuli in
different contexts with respect to dif-
ferent histories of relational activity
(see Roche et al., 2000). However, it is
another matter to speculate on probable
preexperimental histories. The inter-
pretation of the Watt et al. data in terms
of relational frames is speculative, but
it is nevertheless consistent with recent
research that provides strong clues as
to the broad types of natural language
histories required for such derived
relational responding to emerge (e.g.,
Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
Roche, & Smeets, 2001, in press; Lip-
kens et al., 1993). The Watt et al. re-
search also seems to suggest that we
may use this approach in "diagnostic"
procedures to examine the types of ver-
bal relations that operate in social dis-
course. Indeed, this was attempted in a
further study (Roche & Barnes, 1996)
with respect to the categorization of
sexual terms.
In the Roche and Barnes (1996)
study, male and female undergraduate
students were first exposed to a rela-
tional pretraining procedure to estab-
lish directly the contextual control
functions of same, opposite, and dif-
ferent with three abstract stimuli. A
sexual categorization test was admin-
istered to see if subjects would spon-
taneously categorize the words penis
and vagina with dominate, submit, and
forget according to the relations spec-
ified by the three contextual cues. Re-
sults showed that when the same con-
textual cue was present, all subjects re-
liably matched penis with dominate
and vagina with submit. However, in
the presence of the opposite contextual
cue, subjects consistently matched pe-
nis with submit and vagina with dom-
inate. Finally, when presented with pe-
nis or vagina in the presence of the dif-
ferent contextual cue, subjects always
chose forget. In effect, the relational
test identified some rather persistent
sexual categories in operation within
the verbal community in which the
subject socialized.
The findings of Roche and Barnes
(1996) provide behavior-analytic sup-
port for the possibility that gender and
gender relations are socially construct-
ed through language (e.g., Gergen,
1988). Feminist critics and social con-
structionists alike have argued that the
characteristics of masculinity and fem-
ininity (e.g., dominance and submis-
sion) are deeply embedded in social
discourse concerning men and women
(e.g., Bem, 1993). Others have argued
that these linguistic constructions of
gender both reflect and prescribe
modes of social action (see Gergen,
1988). Roche and Barnes (1996) agree
with these views and, moreover, devel-
oped an experimental methodology
and an empirical analysis of gender in
terms of RFT. In this way, RFT repre-
sents the beginnings of a technical be-
havioral analysis of the social con-
struction of gender.
Group Cohesion
Social psychologists have identified
several factors that appear to determine
the cohesiveness of social groupings,
such as attraction (see Hogg & Hains,
1996), similarity (Goethals & Darley,
1977), shared perceived threats (Lan-
zetta, 1955; Turner, Pratkanis, Probas-
co, & Leve, 1992), or shared values
and norms (Cota, Evans, Dion, Kilik,
& Longman, 1995; Zacarro & McCoy,
1988). However, the processes that
give rise to enhanced cohesion are not
clearly identified. One group of behav-
ioral researchers has conceptualized
the cohesiveness of groups in terms of
the reinforcing effects of membership
and the punishing effects of group de-
sertion (Cota et al., 1995). Reinforce-
ment and punishment surely play an
important role in group cohesion, but
these ideas fall short of accommodat-
ing the clearly verbal nature of the re-
inforcing effects of group membership.
Specifically, important reinforcing fac-
tors such as status, a sense of belong-
ing, and self-esteem appear to be in-
herently verbal. Similarly, the punish-
ing effects of abandoning a group are
never contacted directly by those who
remain within the group, and as such
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must be responded to as verbally stated
future consequences in order to func-
tion as punishers. Thus, it appears that
both positive and negative consequenc-
es of group membership may be con-
tacted indirectly through verbal pro-
cesses (e.g., "I feel like I belong," "I
would be lost without the group").
From an RFT perspective, group
membership depends upon complex
patterns of derived relational respond-
ing with respect to oneself and other
group members. One important idea
for RFT, therefore, is that individuals
learn to respond verbally to their own
behavior with evaluations, interpreta-
tions, and categorizations. As soon as
we can interact verbally with ourselves
(e.g., "I am a Catholic"), we have ver-
bally constructed a "conceptualized
self." Of course, a group can also be
conceptualized in this manner. As soon
as we respond verbally to ourselves in
relation to those around us (e.g., "I am
one of 600 million Catholics on the
planet"), we have verbally constructed
a "conceptualized group." Further-
more, because of the flexibility of de-
rived relational responding, statements
may be made about a group that bear
little relevance to experienced facts
about the group. For example, an in-
dividual may speak of his or her home
football team as "the greatest in the
world" despite their appalling track
record on the field. In this case, the
greatness of the group is one of its ver-
bally constructed features.
The discrimination of shared fea-
tures, such as values and beliefs, across
group members may lead to a strength-
ening of the conceptualized group as a
verbally constructed entity. In technical
terms, such abstracted similarities can
increase cohesion because they serve
as contextual cues for frames of coor-
dination or hierarchical class member-
ship being applied to group members.
For example, groups may adopt uni-
versal dress or conduct codes to in-
crease the salience of shared character-
istics as defining properties of group
membership and to decrease the sa-
lience of the unique characteristics of
members (particularly those character-
istics that might conflict with group
membership).
One factor that is widely considered
to have a powerful effect on group co-
hesiveness is the perception of a com-
mon threat to group members (see
Turner et al., 1992). Specifically, re-
search has shown that when groups are
under a perceived threat, members tend
to become more concerned for the wel-
fare of the group as a whole. Relational
frame theory uses the concept of the
conceptualized group to explain this
effect. Specifically, in a conceptualized
group an individual shares features
verbally with other members that are
important defining features of that
group, such as religion, ethnicity, and
so on. Insofar as group membership is
a relational matter, a threat to a group
is also a threat to individual members,
and vice versa. In technical terms, a
threat to the conceptualized group may
transfer through hierarchical relations
(e.g., from leader to followers) or
through relations of coordination (e.g.,
from one member to another) to each
individual in that group. Given this de-
rived threat to each individual, it is
hardly surprising that group cohesion
often increases.
One way in which groups maintain
or enhance cohesion involves the alter-
ation of reinforcing functions through
the use of formative and motivative
augmentals. Augmentals are state-
ments that establish or alter reinforcing
consequences but do not change the
probability of reinforcement contingent
on behavior. As such, they are the
terms used in RFT for dealing with es-
tablishing stimuli (Michael, 1982) and
function-altering stimuli (Schlinger &
Blakely, 1987). The functions of con-
sequences can be changed as soon as
they participate in derived relations.
Consider, for example, the motivative
augmental statement "Wouldn't a hot
juicy cheeseburger be delicious right
now?" If this statement leads to burger
eating, we cannot call it a discrimina-
tive stimulus: Eating burgers is as like-
ly to be reinforced in the absence of
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the statement as in its presence. Rather,
the statement operates as a verbal es-
tablishing stimulus that alters the re-
inforcing functions of cheeseburgers
by bringing the listener into direct con-
tact with the perceptual functions of
eating a cheeseburger (e.g., the listener
may actually salivate). A formative
augmental, on the other hand, estab-
lishes reinforcing or punishing conse-
quences for a previously neutral event.
An example might be "these slips are
worth chances on money prizes." If
the slips now function for the first time
as a reinforcer, the statement was a for-
mative augmental. The effect may then
be expanded through a relational net-
work. For example, when money is an
existing reinforcer, the phrase "push
the button to earn slips" may now be-
come the functional equivalent of
"push the button to earn money." The
important point, then, is that formative
augmentals can contribute to behavior-
al regulation even if the "new" con-
sequences are never actually contacted
by the listener.
Augmental control plays an impor-
tant part in the cohesion of religious
groups when powerful reinforcers
available outside the group (e.g., sex)
and powerful punishers delivered in-
side the group (e.g., self-flagellation,
fasting) can weaken the loyalty of
group members. More specifically, re-
ligious groups often speak of biologi-
cal reinforcers such as sex, drugs, food,
alcohol, and rest as undesirable. Such
reinforcers can threaten group cohesion
because they often control behavior
more effectively than the verbally con-
structed distant consequences of reli-
gious rule following. To ameliorate the
possibility of membership loss as a re-
sult of these, it is often thought nec-
essary to establish negative functions
for these activities so that they partic-
ipate in frames of coordination with
terms such as bad, evil, morally weak,
dangerous, and the like. When the
threat of desertion is great, group
members will exert considerable effort
in forbidding contact with outsiders
and in verbally constructing relations
of opposition and difference between
group members and their families or
mainstream society in general (e.g., the
Moonies, the Branch Davidians). For
instance, nonmembers may be verbally
coordinated with terms such as the
problem, or placed in frames of oppo-
sition with terms such as the chosen
ones. The establishment of such verbal
relations may have the effect of ren-
dering the functions of contact with
family and other nonmembers as less
reinforcing, and possibly even aver-
sive, thereby protecting the group from
dissolution.
Just as cohesive groups must some-
times arrange the transformation of re-
inforcing functions, it is sometimes
necessary to transform the functions of
some primary punishers such that they
function as reinforcers. Violent gang
initiation rites serve as an example.
More specifically, gangs sometimes
make full group membership condi-
tional upon the completion of a phys-
ical endurance test, often involving
physical beatings by other group mem-
bers. The endurance of such rituals is
relationally coordinated with such
terms as got what it takes and made of
the right stuff. Indeed, even following
a traumatic initiation rite, further phys-
ical assaults endured by a member on
the gang's behalf will often secure in-
creased status for that individual. By
confining the source of reinforcement
to activity within the group and fram-
ing previous reinforcers as punishers
and former punishers as reinforcers, a
group can verbally construct a new
picture of social reality in which good
becomes bad and bad becomes good
(see Wilder & Shapiro, 1991). In this
way, it becomes more difficult for any
member of the group to return to the
mainstream culture.
Attitudes and Attitude Change
It is almost a cliche to suggest that
the study of attitudes is a cornerstone
of social psychology. Different re-
searchers have defined attitudes in dif-
ferent ways, but most widely accepted
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definitions make reference to an affec-
tive or evaluative component as well as
to cognitive and behavioral compo-
nents (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.
463). One behavior-analytic study at-
tempted to use a stimulus equivalence
paradigm to analyze the evaluative
component and the transfer of evalua-
tive functions in accordance with de-
rived relations. These researchers
(Grey & Barnes, 1996) conceived an
attitude as a network of derived and
explicitly reinforced stimulus relations
according to which the functions of
events are transformed (e.g., a negative
attitude towards condom use could be
seen as responding in accordance with
an equivalence relation between actual
condoms and descriptive terms such as
unromantic and disgusting; see also
Moxon, Keenan, & Hine, 1993;
Schauss et al., 1997; Watt et al., 1991).
Grey and Barnes (1996) used a
matching-to-sample procedure to es-
tablish three three-member equivalence
classes (Al, Bi, Cl; A2, B2, C2; A3,
B3, C3) using nonsense syllables as
stimuli. One member from two of these
classes (Al and A2) was then used to
clearly label one of two videocassettes.
The videos contained film clips of ei-
ther a romantic or a religious nature.
Having viewed the videos, subjects
were required to categorize as good or
bad four additional videocassettes la-
beled with one of each of the remain-
ing nonsense syllables from the Al and
A2 classes (i.e., Bi, Cl, B2, C2). Re-
sults showed that these additional vid-
eocassettes were categorized according
to the established equivalence classes,
despite the fact that subjects had not
been exposed to the contents of those
tapes. In effect, the study demonstrated
the transfer of an evaluative response
from Al and A2 to further stimuli in
accordance with derived relations.
The Grey and Barnes (1996) study
demonstrated that attitudes may be
usefully conceived of in terms of de-
rived stimulus relations and the trans-
fer of functions. However, that study
did not attempt to alter the relations or
functions involved, thereby providing a
more complete experimental analogue
of attitude formation and change. One
further study (Roche et al., 1997) at-
tempted to do just that.
In the first of four experiments,
Roche et al. (1997) established sexual
arousal functions for two nonsense syl-
lables, which we will refer to here as
Al and Cl, and nonsexual functions
for two further nonsense syllables,
which we will call A2 and C2. This
was achieved by pairing presentations
of Al and Cl with sexual film clips
and A2 and C2 with nonsexual film
clips on a TV monitor. The functions
of the stimuli were then assessed by
the outcome of a conditional discrimi-
nation test presented to subjects on a
computer. On this test, all 5 subjects
matched stimuli on the basis of simi-
larity in function (i.e., matched Al
with Cl and A2 with C2).
Subjects were then trained on the
following conditional discriminations,
Al-Bl, A2-B2, Bl-C2, B2-C1, after
which the conditional discrimination
test was again administered. Given this
training, we would expect subjects to
produce the equivalence relations Al-
B1-C2 and A2-B2-C1. However, these
equivalence relations would also con-
tain members with incongruous func-
tions (e.g., Al and C2 are sexual and
nonsexual, respectively). Results from
Experiment 1 showed that all 5 sub-
jects continued to match Al with Cl
and A2 with C2 in accordance with the
original stimulus-pairing contingen-
cies. Thus, it appeared that subjects
who first matched stimuli on the basis
of their functions following the pairing
procedure were unlikely to produce the
equivalence relations containing emo-
tionally incongruous members (i.e.,
matching-to-sample training failed to
override the sexual-nonsexual stimu-
lus-pairing history).
In a further condition, subjects were
first exposed to the conditional dis-
crimination training. Having passed the
equivalence tests, subjects were ex-
posed to an incongruous stimulus-pair-
ing procedure in which Al and C2
were paired with sexual stimuli and A2
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and C I were paired with nonsexual
stimuli. On a subsequent conditional
discrimination test, all subjects contin-
ued to match stimuli based on derived
equivalence relations (i.e., stimulus
pairings failed to override the match-
ing-to-sample training). In effect, Ex-
periment 1 showed that once a re-
sponse pattern was established using a
stimulus pairing or conditional dis-
crimination training procedure, this
performance was persistent even after
exposure to incongruous training phas-
es that we might otherwise expect to
give rise to alternative performances.
Indeed, in a further experiment (Ex-
periment 3), subjects were repeatedly
exposed to these incongruous training
phases without affecting their original
conditional discrimination test perfor-
mance.
Experiment 2 omitted the condition-
al discrimination test following the ini-
tial training phase (i.e., conditional dis-
crimination or stimulus-pairing train-
ing). Results indicated that when the
initial training was untested, subse-
quent conditional discrimination tests
were controlled by the most recent
training rather than by the initial train-
ing. In effect, persistent conditional
discrimination test performances were
not controlled by initial training con-
ditions alone. Persistent performances
arose only when subjects produced de-
rived relations based on their initial
training before being exposed to incon-
gruous contingencies.
Experiment 4 tested the possibility
that the incongruous contingencies
failed to control behavior precisely be-
cause of their novel trial format (i.e.,
stimulus pairing vs. match to sample).
In this experiment, subjects were first
exposed to the types of contingencies
that would later serve as incongruous.
More specifically, some subjects were
exposed to preliminary stimulus pair-
ing and conditional discrimination test-
ing with one set of stimuli before a sec-
ond stimulus set was used to conduct
conditional discrimination training and
testing followed by incongruous stim-
ulus pairing and testing. Other subjects
were exposed to preliminary condition-
al discrimination training and testing
with one stimulus set before a second
stimulus set was used to conduct stim-
ulus pairing and testing followed by in-
congruous conditional discrimination
training and testing. Results indicated
that after a history of stimulus pairing
and testing, equivalence-based test per-
formances were often altered by the in-
congruous stimulus pairing and testing.
Similarly, after a history of conditional
discrimination training, stimulus-pair-
ing-based test performance was often
altered by incongruous conditional dis-
crimination training and testing. Thus,
a critical controlling variable for test
performances appeared to have been
the subjects' previous history of ex-
posure to particular forms of stimulus
control.
These analogue studies may repre-
sent the first steps towards an experi-
mental analysis of attitude formation
and change. Specifically, the findings
suggest that once an attitude has been
formed (e.g., an equivalence relation
between condoms and disgusting), this
relation may persist despite personal
experiences that might be expected to
undermine such attitudes (e.g., seeing
a sexual health advertisement). Al-
though this is an alarming finding,
Roche et al. (1997) suggested a means
by which we might disrupt such per-
sistent attitudes.
Consider, once again, Experiment 4
in which some subjects were provided
with a history of responding in accor-
dance with conditional discriminations
unrelated to those trained and tested
subsequently. These subjects were then
exposed to stimulus pairing and con-
ditional discrimination testing. All sub-
jects responded to the test by matching
samples and comparisons on the basis
of their common sexual and nonsexual
functions. Finally, the subjects were
exposed to incongruous conditional
discrimination training, after which
they shifted their stimulus-pairing-
based performance to one based on de-
rived equivalence relations. In effect,
the pretraining appeared to sensitize
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subjects' test performances to new
learning experiences. Although this
finding involved training manipula-
tions made before the persistent test
performances could emerge, the exper-
iment suggests ways in which we
might control already-established per-
sistent attitudes.
As an example, consider a man who
has heard and persistently believes that
"real men don't use condoms." As the
Roche et al. (1997) study suggests, the
attempts of a community worker to un-
dermine this attitude by repeatedly
contradicting him, or by introducing
him to individuals who have been ex-
posed to the AIDS virus through un-
safe sex, may do little to alter his at-
titude towards condom use. However,
the results of Experiment 4 suggest that
the negative attitude may persist be-
cause the individual has no history of
reinforcement for responding in the
context of the community worker.
More specifically, subjects who were
provided with the opportunity to pro-
duce or derive relations trained in a
particular context (i.e., stimulus pairing
or matching to sample) were more sen-
sitive to deriving relations trained in
that way in the future. This suggests
two ways in which we might address a
persistent attitude. First, we might ex-
pose this individual to a form of "nov-
el pretraining," in which we familiar-
ize him or her with a community work-
er as a general source of behavioral
control. One way to gain behavioral
control easily would be to establish
novel verbal relations that are already
consistent with verbal networks for the
listener. For instance, if the individual
in question is a sports enthusiast, a
community worker might attempt to
establish such relations as "regular ex-
ercise and a balanced diet prolong
life." In effect, a variety of attitudes
unrelated to the issue of condom use
could be reinforced. Following a his-
tory of establishing and reinforcing
verbal relations, the community worker
might attempt to establish incongruous
verbal relations such as "real men do
wear condoms." In commonsense
terms, the community worker could
first establish him or herself as a reli-
able source of information before at-
tempting to shift persistent attitudes.
Second, the community worker
might deliver a message through a per-
son who has already demonstrated an
influence over the individual's behav-
ior. A respected and familiar person
who has already demonstrated behav-
ioral control should serve as an effec-
tive agent of attitude change when in-
congruous and novel verbal relations
are presented. Indeed, this conclusion
has been supported by intervention
studies that have found that the safe-
sex practices employed by eminent
members of social groups were even-
tually emulated by members of those
groups (Kelly et al., 1991, 1992; Wul-
fert & Biglan, 1994).
Of course, the RFT analysis of atti-
tude formation and change is interpre-
tive. More detailed empirical analyses
may establish that the effectiveness of
a familiar individual in delivering a
novel message depends partly upon as-
sociative processes and a history of di-
rect reinforcement for rule following.
Nevertheless, it is almost inconceiv-
able that attitude formation and change
are entirely nonverbal processes that
involve no derived relational activity.
The analogue studies described here
represent only the first step in the ex-
perimental analysis of those behavioral
processes involved in the formation
and maintenance of persistent attitudes.
Moreover, we have only just begun to
analyze methods that might be used for
altering persistent attitudes when they
are to the detriment of the individual
or the wider culture. Nevertheless, the
relatively consistent data reported by
Roche et al. (1997) suggest that further
basic research along the foregoing
lines would be well worthwhile.
Persuasion and Rhetoric
The first widely held view of per-
suasion as a psychological process was
known as the Yale model (Hovland,
Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Hov-
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land & Mandell, 1952). According to
this model, beliefs are swayed primar-
ily by coherent arguments. Persuasion
is most effective, therefore, when it ap-
peals to logic. Hovland and his col-
leagues proposed that persuasion ef-
forts must involve getting individuals
to notice, understand, and remember an
alternative viewpoint. They also ar-
gued that propaganda works by sup-
pressing intellectual reasoning during
the delivery of a novel message, for
instance by bombarding an individual
with information.
Recent RFT evidence shows, how-
ever, that once derived, verbal relations
may resurge at a later time in an ap-
propriate context without additional
training designed to bring about such
resurgence (Wilson & Hayes, 1996;
see also Healy, Barnes-Holmes, &
Smeets, 2000). From the RFT perspec-
tive, therefore, the propagandist might
do well to alter the functions of al-
ready-established verbal relations
through rhetoric rather than attempting
to extinguish them (see also Roche et
al., 1997).
Perhaps the simplest form of persua-
sion or rhetoric involves the alteration
and weakening of psychological func-
tions maintained by verbal relations for
the listener. Weakening these functions
is perhaps the most fundamental aspect
of rhetoric because individuals are
slow to respond positively to messages
that compete with their beliefs and
opinions (Hovland et al., 1949). As an
example, consider a salesperson who
must regularly contend with such prob-
lematic socially established verbal re-
lations as "all salespeople are liars."
Once a relational frame is established
between such terms as salesperson and
liar, it is difficult for the salesperson to
say anything without having the func-
tions of "liar" evoked for the listener.
One rhetorical means by which the
functions of the problematic relational
network can be weakened, however, is
to use terms and phrases that coordi-
nate with trustworthy individuals and
that participate in frames of opposition
with dishonest salespersons. For ex-
ample, the salesperson might say, "you
are under no obligation to buy," or "if
you are not completely satisfied you
can have your money back," or "take
it now for free and if you like it you
can send us the money next month."
Thus, the pitch will participate in a re-
lational network with other terms (e.g.,
trustworthy), stimuli (e.g., items pur-
chased in a department store), and con-
sequences (pleasure of using recently
purchased items) that form part of any
normal sales process. In effect, use of
these and similar phrases may trans-
form the functions of the sales pitch so
that it does not evoke functions of dis-
honesty.
As suggested above, RFT maintains
that a salesperson is unlikely to weaken
problematic "dishonesty functions" by
contradicting them directly. Specifical-
ly, direct reference to dishonesty itself
is bound only to evoke the relevant
functions, even when the term is
placed in a frame of opposition with
salespeople. In the same way, it is im-
possible to literally follow the rule "do
not think of a pink elephant" because
in order to do so, one must first re-
spond covertly to the visual perceptual
features of a pink elephant. Thus, an
ineffective way for a salesperson to
generate trust would be to use the
phrase "trust me," because the phrase
may actually serve to strengthen the
problematic functions of dishonesty at-
tached to salespeople.
Motivative augmentals may also be
used to increase the value of verbally
stated consequences. Health and life
insurance companies, for example, rely
heavily on this technique. Advertise-
ments for such companies often aim to
bring the listener into direct emotional
contact with verbally constructed con-
sequences of not purchasing insurance.
Whereas these companies procure their
profits on the basis that a greater num-
ber of people buy insurance than will
need it, they nevertheless speak of
these risks in such a way that they be-
come psychologically proximate. This
is achieved by framing aversive events
in temporal relations. Temporal rela-
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tions are based on the nonarbitrary ex-
perience of change, and like all rela-
tions can be arbitrarily applied to trans-
form the functions of stated events
(e.g., "old age is closer than you
think"). For the same purpose, adver-
tisers may also employ if-then rela-
tions (e.g., "if you injure your back
you will not be able to support your
family") and relations of coordination
(e.g., "this could happen to you").
Such relations serve to transform the
functions of the stated future conse-
quences such that their reinforcing and
punishing functions are enhanced. In
each of these cases, of course, deictic
relations are also involved. Deictic re-
lations are those that specify a relation
in terms of the perspective of the
speaker, such as left-right, I-you, here-
there, and now-then (see Barnes &
Roche, 1997; Hayes, 1984). Thus,
most cases of rhetoric require the lis-
tener to respond from a perspective dif-
ferent from that of the speaker. That is,
a listener may respond to "this could
happen to you" as "that could happen
to me." (See Barnes & Roche, 1997;
Y. Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001, for further in-
formation on the development of deic-
tic relations.)
The foregoing RFT analysis is con-
sistent with the rationale of the theory
of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980), which attempts to make sense
of attitude and behavior change in
terms of an individual's perception of
susceptibility to aversive consequences
(e.g., developing lung cancer because
of smoking), their perceived compe-
tence in avoiding negative consequenc-
es (e.g., quitting smoking), and the val-
ue placed on the consequences of a be-
havior change (e.g., avoiding cancer).
Thus, persuasive narratives that are
emotionally provocative, informative,
and directive should be effective in
generating a change in attitude and an
attendant change in behavior. From the
RFT perspective, such narratives bring
aversive verbally constructed conse-
quences into psychological proximity.
In addition, the provision of a directive
rule that evokes functions of escape
from these aversive consequences
through appropriate relational frames
(e.g., "buy our insurance and sleep
easy") may make rule following more
likely.
One further technique commonly
used by rhetoricians for the transfor-
mation of verbal functions involves the
showcasing of a listener's verbal incon-
sistency. As outlined earlier, verbal
consistency likely serves as a powerful
reinforcer for verbal behavior itself.
Moreover, verbal inconsistency is es-
tablished as a powerful punisher for
most members of the verbal commu-
nity (see Guerin, 1994, p. 159; Schauss
et al., 1997). Convincing speakers are
skilled at using the listener's verbal in-
consistency as a punisher. The effec-
tiveness of the technique is based on
the simple fact that nobody likes to feel
foolish or confused. The rhetorician,
therefore, will find ways to evoke the
frustrating functions of two incongru-
ent verbal relations that are produced
by the listener. An insurance advertise-
ment, for instance, may read, "People
who care about their families are in-
sured with Acme insurance." Here the
listener must respond to a verbal rela-
tion (i.e., the slogan) that is not con-
sistent with other relations in the lis-
tener's verbal repertoire (e.g., "I care
about my family and I do not have
Acme insurance"). If verbal consisten-
cy is to be maintained, then one of the
two verbal relations must change. In-
terestingly, the problem faced by the
listener in this case is similar to that
presented to subjects in Festinger's
(1957) cognitive dissonance studies. If
effective, the rhetorical devices used
by advertisers will be powerful enough
that the verbal behavior of some indi-
viduals will be transformed such that
consistency is achieved (i.e., the listen-
er purchases Acme insurance). For oth-
er individuals, however, previously es-
tablished verbal relations such as "ad-
vertisers will say anything to get you
to buy their products" will reduce the
impact of advertising slogans.
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Conclusion
Relational frame theory represents a
relatively recent advance within the
evolution of behavior analysis. In a
short time, RFT has shown itself to be
a viable paradigm for the experimental
investigation of complex human be-
havior (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001). In addition, the limited
research reviewed here suggests that
RFT may also provide a useful re-
search route to many social psycholog-
ical phenomena that hitherto lay be-
yond the empirical reach of behavior
analysis. Of course, RFT was applied
here somewhat speculatively to a range
of social phenomena, and much work
remains to be done in assessing its util-
ity in this regard. Nevertheless, it has
served us well in the current context
by providing a vital new approach to a
host of important psychological ques-
tions and generating a wealth of em-
pirical research into a diverse range of
psychological phenomena.
REFERENCES
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understand-
ing attitudes and predicting social behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Baer, R. A., Detrich, R., & Weninger, J. M.
(1988). On the functional role of the verbal-
ization in correspondence training procedures.
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 21,
345-356.
Barnes, D. (1994). Stimulus equivalence and
relational frame theory. The Psychological
Record, 44, 91-124.
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1997). A behavior-
analytic approach to behavioral reflexivity.
The Psychological Record, 47, 543-572.
Barnes-Holmes, D., & Barnes-Holmes, Y.
(2000). Understanding complex human be-
havior: Two approaches to the concept of gen-
eralized operant classes. The Psychological
Record, 50, 251-265.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Cul-
linan, V. (2000). Relational frame theory and
Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A possible synthe-
sis. The Behavior Analyst, 23, 69-84.
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche,
B., & Smeets, P M. (2001). Exemplar train-
ing and a derived transformation of function
in accordance with symmetry. The Psycholog-
ical Record, 51, 287-308.
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche,
B., & Smeets, P M. (in press). Exemplar
training and a derived transformation of func-
tion in accordance with symmetry: II. The
Psychological Record.
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Hayes, S. C., Barnes-
Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (2001). Relational
frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of
human language and cognition. In H. W.
Reese & R. Kail (Eds.), Advances in child de-
velopment and behavior (Vol. 28, pp. 101-
138). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Bem, S. L. (1993). The lenses of gender. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bush, K. M., Sidman, M., & de Rose, T. (1989).
Contextual control of emergent equivalence
relations. Journal of the Experimental Analy-
sis of Behavior, 51, 29-45.
Catania, A. C., Shimoff, E., & Matthews, B. A.
(1987). Correspondence between definitions
and procedures: A reply to Stokes, Osnes, and
Guevremont. Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis, 20, 401-404.
Chase, P N., & Danforth, J. S. (1991). The role
of rules in concept learning. In L. J. Hayes &
P N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal be-
havior (pp. 205-225). Reno, NV: Context
Press.
Cota, A. A., Evans, C. R., Dion, K. L., Kilik,
L., & Longman, R. S. (1995). The structure
of group cohesion. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 572-580.
Cullinan, V., Barnes, D., Hampson, P. J., & Lyd-
dy, F (1994). The contribution of behaviour
analysis to a connectionist model of basic syn-
tax. In G. Orchard (Ed.), Neural computing
research and applications (Part 2, pp. 33-45).
Belfast, Northern Ireland: INNA.
de Freitas Ribeiro, A. (1989). Correspondence
in children's self-report: Tacting and manding
aspects. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior, 51, 361-367.
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1995). A transfor-
mation of self-discrimination response func-
tions through the arbitrarily applicable rela-
tions of sameness, more than, and less than.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Be-
havior, 64, 163-184.
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1996). A transfor-
mation of self-discrimination response func-
tions in accordance with the arbitrarily appli-
cable relations of sameness and opposition.
The Psychological Record, 46, 271-300.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dis-
sonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Fields, L., Adams, B. J., Verhave, T, & New-
man, S. (1990). The effects of nodality on the
formation of equivalence classes. Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 53,
345-358.
Fiske, S. T, & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cog-
nition (2nd ed.). Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
Gergen, M. M. (1988). Towards a feminist me-
tatheory and methodology in the social sci-
ences. In M. M. Gergen (Ed.), Feminist
thought and the structure of knowledge (pp.
87-104). New York: New York University
Press.
90 BRYAN ROCHE et al.
Goethals, G. R., & Darley, J. (1977). Social
comparison theory: An attributional approach.
In J. M. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social
comparison processes: Theoretical and em-
pirical perspectives (pp. 259-278). Washing-
ton, DC: Hemisphere.
Grey, I., & Barnes, D. (1996). Stimulus equiv-
alence and attitudes. The Psychological Rec-
ord, 46, 243-270.
Guerin, B. (1994). Analyzing social behavior:
Behavior analysis and the social sciences.
Reno, NV: Context Press.
Harris, M. H. (1977). Cannibals and kings.
New York: Vintage Books.
Harrison, R. J., & Green, G. (1990). Develop-
ment of conditional and equivalence relations
without differential consequences. Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 54,
225-237.
Hayes, S. C. (1984). Making sense of spiritu-
ality. Behaviorism, 12, 99-110.
Hayes, S. C. (1991). A relational control theory
of stimulus equivalence. In L. J. Hayes & P.
N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal behav-
ior (pp. 19-40). Reno, NV: Context Press.
Hayes, S. C. (1994). Relational frame theory:
A functional approach to verbal events. In S.
C. Hayes, L. J. Hayes, 0. Sato, & K. Ono
(Eds.), Behavior analysis of language and
cognition (pp. 9-30). Reno, NV: Context
Press.
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B.
(Eds.). (2001). Relational frame theory: A
post-Skinnerian account of human language
and cognition. New York: Plenum.
Hayes, S. C., Blackledge, J. T, & Barnes-
Holmes, D. (2001). Language and cognition:
Constructing an alternative approach within
the behavioral tradition. In S. C. Hayes, D.
Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relation-
alframe theory: A post-Skinnerian account of
human language and cognition (pp. 3-20).
New York: Plenum.
Hayes, S. C., Gifford, E. V., & Ruckstuhl, L. E.
(1996). Relational frame theory and executive
function: A behavioral approach. In G. R.
Lyon & N. A. Krasnegor (Eds.), Attention,
memory, and executive function (pp. 279-
306). Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes.
Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J. (1989). The verbal
action of the listener as the basis for rule-gov-
ernance. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rule-governed
behavior: Cognition, contingencies and in-
structional control (pp. 153-190). New York:
Plenum.
Healy, O., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Smeets, P M.
(2000). Derived relational responding as gen-
eralized operant behavior. Journal of the Ex-
perimental Analysis ofBehavior, 74, 207-227.
Hogg, M. A., & Hains, S. C. (1996). Intergroup
relations and group solidarity: Effects of
group identification and social beliefs on de-
personalized attraction. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 70, 295-309.
Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Intergroup
behaviour, self categorisation and the salience
of social categories. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 26, 325-340.
Houmanfar, R., Hayes, L. J., & Fredericks, D.
W. (2001). Religion and cultural survival.
The Psychological Record, 51, 19-37.
Hovland, C. I., Lumsdaine, A. A., & Sheffield,
F D. (1949). Experiments on mass commu-
nication. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Hovland, C. I., & Mandell, W. (1952). An ex-
perimental comparison of conclusion-drawing
by the communicator and by the audience.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
47, 581-588.
Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural psychology. Chi-
cago: Principia Press.
Kelly, J. A., St. Lawrence, J. S., Diaz, Y. E.,
Stevenson, L. Y., Hauth, A. C., Brasfield, T
L., et al. (1991). HIV risk behavior reduction
following intervention with key opinion lead-
ers of a population: An experimental com-
munity-level analysis. American Journal of
Public Health, 81, 168-171.
Kelly, J. A., St. Lawrence, J. S., Stevenson, L.
Y., Hauth, A. C., Kalichman, S. C., Diaz, Y.
E., et al. (1992). Community AIDS/HIV risk
reduction: The effects of endorsements by
popular people in three cities. American Jour-
nal of Public Health, 82, 1483-1489.
Kunkel, J. H. (1997). The analysis of rule-gov-
erned behavior in social psychology. The Psy-
chological Record, 47, 699-716.
Lanzetta, J. T (1955). Group behavior under
stress. Human Relations, 8, 29-52.
Lipkens, G., Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J.
(1993). Longitudinal study of derived stimu-
lus relations in an infant. Journal of Experi-
mental Child Psychology, 56, 201-239.
Lloyd, K. E. (1980). Do as I say, not as I do.
New Zealand Psychologist, 9, 1-8.
Michael, J. (1982). Distinguishing between dis-
criminative and motivational functions of
stimuli. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior, 37, 149-155.
Moxon, P D., Keenan, M., & Hine, L. (1993).
Gender role stereotyping and stimulus equiv-
alence. The Psychological Record, 43, 381-
394.
O'Hora, D., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2001). The
referential nature of rules and instructions: A
response to Instructions, Rules, and Abstrac-
tions: A Misconstrued Relation by Emilio Ri-
bes-Ifiesta. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 21-
25.
O'Hora, D., Roche, B., Barnes-Holmes, D., &
Smeets, P M. (in press). Response latencies
to multiple derived stimulus relations: Testing
two predictions of relational frame theory.
The Psychological Record.
Paniagua, F A. (1985). Development of self-
care skills and helping behaviors in adoles-
cents in a group home through correspon-
dence training. Journal of Behavior Therapy
and Experimental Psychiatry, 16, 237-244.
Pilgrim, C., & Galizio, M. (1995). Reversal of
baseline relations and stimulus equivalence I.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY 91
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Be-
havior, 63, 225-238.
Pilgrim, C., Jackson, J., & Galizio, M. (2000).
Acquisition of arbitrary conditional discrimi-
nations by young normally developing chil-
dren. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 73, 177-193.
Riegler, H. C., & Baer, D. M. (1989). A devel-
opmental analysis of rule-following. In H. W.
Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development
and behavior (Vol. 21, pp. 191-219). New
York: Academic Press.
Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1996). Arbitrarily ap-
plicable relational responding and sexual cat-
egorization: A critical test of the derived dif-
ference relation. The Psychological Record,
46, 451-475.
Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1997). A transfor-
mation of respondently conditioned stimulus
functions in accordance with arbitrarily appli-
cable relations. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 67, 275-301.
Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1998). The experi-
mental analysis of human sexual arousal:
Some recent developments. The Behavior An-
alyst, 21, 37-52.
Roche, B., Barnes, D., & Smeets, P M. (1997).
Incongruous stimulus pairing and conditional
discrimination training: Effects on relational
responding. Journal of the Experimental Anal-
ysis of Behavior, 68, 143-160.
Roche, B., Barnes-Holmes, D., Smeets, P M.,
Barnes-Holmes, Y., & McGeady, S. (2000).
Contextual control over the derived transfor-
mation of discriminative and sexual arousal
functions. The Psychological Record, 50,
267-291.
Schauss, S. L., Chase, P. N., & Hawkins, R. P.
(1997). Environment-behavior relations, be-
havior therapy and the process of persuasion
and attitude change. Journal of Behavior
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 28,
31-40.
Schlinger, H., & Blakely, E. (1987). Function-
altering effects of contingency-specifying
stimuli. The Behavior Analyst, 10, 41-45.
Sidman, M. (1992). Equivalence relations:
Some basic considerations. In S. C. Hayes &
L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal re-
lations (pp. 15-27). Reno, NV: Context Press.
Sidman, M. (1994). Equivalence relations and
behavior: A research story. Boston: Authors
Cooperative.
Skinner, B. E (1957). Verbal behavior. New
York: Appelton-Century-Crofts.
Spradlin, J. E., Cotter, V. W., & Baxley, N.
(1973). Establishing a conditional discrimi-
nation without direct training: A study of
transfer with retarded adolescents. American
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 77, 556-566.
Spradlin, J. E., Saunders, K. J., & Saunders, R.
R. (1992). The stability of equivalence clas-
ses. In S. C. Hayes & L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Un-
derstanding verbal relations (pp. 29-43).
Reno, NV: Context Press.
Steele, D., & Hayes, S. C. (1991). Stimulus
equivalence and arbitrarily applicable rela-
tional responding. Journal of the Experimen-
tal Analysis of Behavior, 56, 519-555.
Stewart, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., &
Lipkens, R. (2001). Relations among rela-
tions: Analogy, metaphor, and allegory. In S.
C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche
(Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skin-
nerian account of human language and cog-
nition (pp. 73-86). New York: Plenum.
Stewart, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche, B., &
Smeets, P. M. (2001). Generating derived re-
lational networks via the abstraction of com-
mon physical properties: A possible model of
analogical reasoning. The Psychological Rec-
ord, 51, 381-408.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social identity and intergroup
relations. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integra-
tive theory of intergroup conflict. In W. Austin
& S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology
of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). Monte-
rey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Turner, M. E., Pratkanis, A. R., Probasco, P., &
Leve, C. (1992). Threat, cohesion, and group
effectiveness: Testing a social identity main-
tenance perspective on groupthink. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 781-
796.
Watt, A., Keenan, M., Barnes, D., & Caims, E.
(1991). Social categorization and stimulus
equivalence. The Psychological Record, 41,
33-50.
Wilder, D. A., & Shapiro, P (1991). Facilitation
of outgroup stereotypes by enhanced ingroup
identity. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 27, 431-452.
Wilson, K. G., & Hayes, S. C. (1996). Resur-
gence of derived stimulus relations. Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 66,
267-281.
Wulfert, E., & Biglan, A. (1994). A contextual
approach to research on AIDS prevention. The
Behavior Analyst, 17, 353-363.
Zacarro, S. J., & McCoy, M. C. (1988). The
effects of task and interpersonal cohesiveness
on performance of a disjunctive group task.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 75,
268-273.
